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BEYOND CORPORATE CONTRACT: A RESPONSE TO 
HELEN HERSHKOFF & MARCEL KAHAN, FORUM-
SELECTION PROVISIONS IN CORPORATE “CONTRACTS” 
Verity Winship* 
Abstract: Corporate charters and bylaws sometimes limit where shareholders can sue. These 
forum terms are commonplace in sophisticated commercial contracts. Their migration into 
corporate documents, however, set off a fight about the balance between private ordering and 
public restraint in corporate law. This essay and the Article to which it responds propose 
alternative analyses of the corporate “contract” and the state’s role in defining it. Both also 
wrestle with how to translate these fundamental concepts into advice for the judges and litigants 
on the ground. This essay looks at the benefits of existing protections—fiduciary duties and 
reasonableness limits. It then broadens the lens to consider how a heightened consent 
mechanism might accommodate the nuances in this area. This approach takes concerns about 
consent seriously, but also takes into account the need to balance respect for private ordering 
with the state’s special role in organizing and governing corporations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
TriQuint Semiconductor—a Delaware corporation with Oregon 
headquarters—merged with another company in the high-tech industry 
in 2015. Two days before merger plans were announced, the TriQuint 
directors adopted a corporate bylaw that made the Delaware Chancery 
Court the only place to bring state corporate law claims, including those 
challenging the merger.1 Nonetheless, plaintiff shareholders brought five 
                                                      
*. Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. 
1. See Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328, 330 (Or. 2015); TriQuint 
Semiconductor, Inc., Amendment to Second Amended and Restated Bylaws of TriQuint 
Semiconductor, Inc., art. XI (Form 8-K) (Feb. 22, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/913885/000119312514063841/d681010dex32.htm 
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suits against the company and its directors, some in Oregon and some in 
Delaware.2 They alleged that the board members underpriced the 
TriQuint stock in return for “lucrative board positions in the new 
corporation.”3 They also fought over whether they could litigate in 
Oregon court, forcing the Oregon court to decide whether forum-
selection bylaws like TriQuint’s were enforceable.4 
Helen Hershkoff and Marcel Kahan’s Article, Forum-Selection 
Provisions in Corporate “Contracts,” addresses itself to that Oregon 
court. It sets itself two difficult goals: (1) to lay out a “properly 
conceived approach to corporate forum-terms” with detail about how the 
approach “would operate in practice” and (2) to use this detailed analysis 
“as a window into larger issues of state power and private ordering.”5 
The authors resist treating corporate charter terms and bylaws as 
contracts because underlying consent is limited and because the state has 
a special role in corporate formation and agreements. They then use 
these two features—limited consent and the state’s role—to develop 
guidance for courts that have to decide whether to enforce forum-
selection bylaws and charter provisions. 
The authors contrast themselves with commentators who call for 
fulsome use of dispute resolution terms in this context. And certainly 
some commentators have heralded these terms as a welcome stake in the 
heart of shareholder litigation.6 But ultimately the authors’ answer to 
“Are these terms valid?” is “sometimes.”7 Which leaves them in the 
                                                      
[https://perma.cc/LX2P-MBGT] (designating the Delaware Chancery Court as the “sole and 
exclusive forum” for a list of claim categories that can be roughly summarized as state corporate 
law claims). 
2. Triquint, 364 P.3d at 330. 
3. Id. 
4. Complaint at 5, Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328 (Feb. 28, 2014) (No. 
1402-02441), 2014 WL 842387.  
5. Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate “Contracts”, 93 
WASH. L. REV. 265, 286, 267 (2018). 
6. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately 
Ordered Solution to the Shareholder Litigation Epidemic (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/thecase-for-allowing-fee-
shifting-bylaws-as-a-privately-ordered-solution-to-the-shareholderlitigat.html 
[https://perma.cc/P957-D8SD] (advocating the use of fee-shifting bylaws to address “a serious 
litigation crisis in American corporate law”). 
7. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 270 (“Although the contractual paradigm is not a 
sufficient basis for the blanket enforcement of corporate forum-terms, we recognize that, in some 
situations, corporate forum terms may be beneficial.”). 
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tricky position of having to get into the details and draw lines. (I write 
this with sympathy, since “sometimes” is also my answer.)8 
In doing so, the authors run into difficult questions: What is a 
corporation? What is shareholder consent? What is an “ordinary 
contract” to which these corporate organizational documents should be 
compared? In other words, they run into all of the fundamental questions 
that make digging into this sometimes-seemingly-technical area of the 
law worthwhile. 
The authors cabin these unwieldy questions with two main moves. 
First, their discussion is limited to forum-selection terms.9 Forum terms 
are not the only charter provision or bylaw designed to shape 
intracorporate litigation, and many provisions raise similar questions 
about shareholder consent and the role of the state in the corporate 
“contract.” However, the authors focus on forum selection, ignoring the 
bestiary of other possible dispute resolution terms—mandatory 
arbitration, jury waivers, discovery limits, fee-shifting, no-pay 
provisions, etc. Also absent is the even greater catalog of bylaws and 
charter provisions that do not deal with litigation and disputes, but that 
are implicated by any discussion of whether corporate charters and 
bylaws count as contracts. 
The authors’ second cabining move is to couch the Article as 
guidance for the judge of the forum that was not selected by the term: 
the Oregon court in the TriQuint example. For forum-selection clauses, 
this is where the real action takes place, when the court must decide 
whether to dismiss in favor of the selected forum. 
This essay comments primarily on the authors’ critique of the 
contractual view and on their practical advice, inevitably leaving out 
many of the interesting complications that the authors raise. The essay 
begins in Part I by providing a brief history. Particularly when the focus 
is on intracorporate forum selection, it is difficult to divorce these terms 
from how they emerged. In fact, many of the reasons the authors give to 
enforce certain terms are rooted in the specific context in which they 
began to be adopted and tested.10 
                                                      
8. See generally Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016) 
[hereinafter Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract] (proposing a framework that encourages 
tailoring of corporate litigation but also limits waiver). 
9. Although forum-selection terms can be either exclusive or permissive (also called “consent to 
jurisdiction” clauses), the Article seems aimed primarily at terms that restrict litigation to a 
particular forum (i.e., exclusive forum terms). 
10. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 310 (indicating that enforcement of some forum-
selection terms promotes public policy in the context of ubiquitous M&A litigation and the 
Delaware courts’ crackdown on disclosure-only settlements). 
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Part II addresses the two main points of the Article: that charters and 
bylaws are not the same as “ordinary contracts” and that the state has a 
special involvement with corporate organization. It points to agreement 
on some of the fundamentals, acknowledging differences between 
certain contracts and corporate organizational documents, complications 
in the nature of shareholder consent, and the special role of the state in 
corporate law. 
Part III outlines an alternative approach. Existing tests of fiduciary 
duties and fundamental fairness address many of the concerns about 
forum-selection terms that the authors raise. This is particularly true in 
the core situation of shareholder representative litigation channeled into 
courts in the state of incorporation. Because the Article is couched as 
advice to the judge, this essay also takes that approach. This essay 
suggests grounds for distinguishing among terms that do not require as 
much bold engagement with tough constitutional questions or as harsh a 
critique of the organizing state. It concludes by broadening the lens to 
consider the promise of heightened consent as a way to accommodate 
the nuances in this area. 
I. CORPORATE FORUM TERMS EMERGE 
Why do corporations organize in Delaware? According to the state’s 
official website, businesses “take advantage of Delaware’s complete 
package of incorporation services, including modern and flexible 
corporate laws, our highly-respected Judiciary and legal community, a 
business-friendly government, and the customer-service-oriented staff of 
the Division of Corporations.”11 Nevada similarly advertises the 
efficiency of the state’s Business Court, “[d]eveloped on the Delaware 
model,” as a reason to organize a business in Nevada.12 
Although these states advertise both law and forum, these are not 
necessarily a package. Shareholder and other intracorporate plaintiffs 
have access to courts in the incorporating state, but can bring suits 
                                                      
11. Incorporate in Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV, 
https://delaware.gov/topics/incorporateindelaware.shtml [https://perma.cc/TU42-3EAC]; see also 
LEWIS LS. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF CORPS., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE 
DELAWARE 1 (2007), https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K6LC-W5RV] (stating that “the source of Delaware’s prestige” is not only its 
corporate statute, but also the Delaware courts, “and, in particular, Delaware’s highly respected 
corporations court, the Court of Chancery”). 
12. The Nevada Advantage, NEV. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/businesses/the-
nevada-advantage [https://perma.cc/MC3Y-MJLA] (advertising Nevada’s low taxes and fees as 
well as its Nevada Business Court that “minimizes the time, cost and risks of commercial 
litigation”).  
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elsewhere as well. The internal affairs doctrine provides that, no matter 
where intracorporate suits are brought, the law of the incorporating state 
defines the duties and the rights of the internal corporate actors—
directors, shareholders, officers, and the corporation.13 But the forum is 
not restricted.14 Or, more precisely, it has only the usual jurisdictional 
restrictions that are not specific to corporate law, and that usually allow 
filing where the corporation is headquartered as well.15 
Nonetheless, good, practical reasons drove this lumping of corporate 
law and forum. As a matter of practice, Delaware corporate law claims 
were filed in Delaware court (especially the Chancery Court). Illinois 
corporate law claims were filed in Illinois court. And so on.16 This 
practice led commentators to consider forum and choice of law together, 
pointing to in-state courts as well as the content of the state’s corporate 
law to explain Delaware’s predominance in public company 
incorporations.17 
In the early 2000s, the growth of a particular type of corporate 
litigation put pressure on this shorthand treatment of corporate law and 
forum as bundled. Shareholder plaintiffs challenged almost every merger 
or acquisition.18 A key aspect of these suits was that they were filed in 
multiple jurisdictions. In TriQuint, for example, lawyers filed 
representative suits on behalf of shareholders in Delaware, the state of 
incorporation. Other lawyers challenged the same corporate deal on 
                                                      
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  
14. This was not always so. The “internal affairs doctrine” designates the law of the incorporating 
state as the law governing internal corporate affairs. See id. But once upon a time, the internal 
affairs doctrine was jurisdictional as well, restricting Delaware intracorporate claims to Delaware 
courts. See Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 258 (1883) (“[A]ll such [internal management] 
controversies must be determined by the courts of the state by which the corporation was created.”).  
15. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (providing 
for general jurisdiction where “the corporation is fairly regarded as at home”); Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137–38 (2014) (identifying the principal place of business and incorporating 
state as “home” for corporations). 
16. See generally John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 605 (2012). 
17. See generally Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group 
Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85 (1990); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition 
Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998). 
18. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012 (Feb. 2, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998482) (finding that 38.7% of 
completed takeovers were challenged in 2005 and 94.2% in 2011); Matthew D. Cain & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015 2 (Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890) (finding that 94.9% of completed takeovers were 
challenged in litigation in 2014 and 87.7% in 2015). 
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behalf of the same shareholders in Oregon, where the company was 
headquartered.19 
These suits were brought in state courts, raising a problem peculiar to 
this aspect of U.S. federalism: the U.S. court system has no easy 
mechanism of consolidation and coordination from state court to state 
court.20 The Delaware legislature could not simply write a statute 
restricting Delaware-law claims to Delaware courts.21 The states were 
thus stuck with relying on forum non conveniens, principles of comity, 
informal coordination with other states’ judges, or a more daunting 
project of state-to-state coordination through uniform laws. Another 
alternative was to have private parties insert forum-selection terms in 
corporate documents and then rely on other states’ courts to enforce 
them.22 
Eventually parties in these multijurisdictional deal suits settled on the 
last option: to include terms in corporate charters and bylaws that 
restricted suits to the state of incorporation—mostly Delaware. The 
possibility of using exclusive forum provisions had been percolating in 
the defense bar,23 then invited (at least for charter provisions) by the 
Delaware Chancery Court,24 then adopted by a few companies,25 then 
tested and approved in court.26 
Ultimately, these provisions were the subject of state-level legislative 
intervention. Part of the prompt for legislation was a development 
regarding another type of term that, like forum selection, sets the rules 
for intracorporate disputes. In 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court 
approved a particularly ferocious fee-shifting provision.27 The provision 
seemed designed to chill shareholder litigation entirely because it 
                                                      
19. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328, 330 (Or. 2015). 
20. See Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX 
LITIG. 51, 88 (2012) [hereinafter Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction]. 
21. Id.  
22. Id. 
23. Ted Mirvis, Anywhere but Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some 
Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17 (May 2007). 
24. In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders’ Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of 
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value-
promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions 
selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”). 
25. See, e.g., Chevron Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000095012310090397/f56977e8vk.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TTM3-92MW]. 
26. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 938–39 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
27. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (approving a fee-
shifting bylaw in a Delaware nonstock corporation). 
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required shareholder plaintiffs to cover fees unless success was total and 
on the merits—a very unusual mix in this context.28 
Delaware’s legislative response was to elaborate on the permissibility 
of including any of three types of clauses in the corporate charters and 
bylaws of Delaware corporations: exclusive forum, mandatory 
arbitration, and fee-shifting provisions. Of most relevance here, the 
legislation allowed exclusive forum-selection provisions to be included 
in a corporation’s charter or bylaws, provided that they did not exclude 
the courts of the incorporating state.29 
The rise of these forum-selection charter provisions and bylaws—and 
the near-simultaneous rise and then fall of fee-shifting provisions and 
bylaws30—put pressure on courts, legislators, and commentators to 
define more carefully the nature of corporate organizational documents 
(especially their relation to contract), the documents’ scope, and the 
extent to which litigation should be considered a right of shareholders. 
Hershkoff and Kahan’s Article, Forum-Selection Provisions in 
Corporate “Contracts,” is part of the growing literature responding to 
this development. 
II. RESISTING “CONTRACT” 
As to the Article’s first point, the quotation marks in the title say it 
all: Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate “Contracts.” The authors 
resist “reflexive” enforcement of exclusive forum terms included in 
corporate charters and bylaws on the ground that they are contractual.31 
Corporate charters and bylaws, they argue, are not the same as what they 
refer to as “ordinary contracts.”32 Why? Shareholder consent is lacking, 
and the state has a special role in corporate contracts—more than it does 
in every contract. 
The authors are not alone in suggesting that corporate charters and 
bylaws are not the same as commercial contracts among sophisticated 
players. Even courts that use the contractual label talk about these 
                                                      
28. Id.  
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2018). The express statutory permission was limited 
to “internal corporate claims,” defined as “claims, including claims in the right of the corporation, 
(i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder 
in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery.” Id.  
30. See id. §§ 102(f), 109(b) (prohibiting Delaware corporations from including certain fee-
shifting provisions in charters and bylaws); ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 555. 
31. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 270. 
32. Id. at 268–69, 271, 277–78, 280 (comparing corporate charters and bylaws to “ordinary 
contracts”). 
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organizational documents as “part of” a “flexible contract.”33 Other 
courts acknowledge that shareholders do not literally sign off on every 
term, or they analogize organizational documents to contracts for 
particular purposes, such as to impose interpretive rules.34 The rationale 
instead is consent to a governance structure that then gives rise to, 
among other things, the possibility of unilateral director amendment of 
bylaws.35 
Shareholders of the same company vary in their relationship to the 
organizational documents with very few, if any, in the same position as a 
sophisticated player who reads, negotiates, and signs an agreement. How 
much shareholder consent resembles robust and idealized contractual 
consent depends in part on whether the term at issue was in a charter or 
bylaws and when the shareholder bought the shares.36 
A few examples give a sense of the complexities. A charter provision 
that appears in the IPO documents gives notice, but is sticky as it can 
only be changed with a shareholder vote. Midstream amendment to the 
charter requires a shareholder vote, but a shareholder could vote against 
it and still be bound by the majority. Bylaws generally can be amended 
unilaterally by management, giving no notice of the specific term and 
raising concerns about conflicts when the directors are defendants. 
The authors compare the organizational documents to “ordinary 
contracts,” but it is not entirely fair to contrast these corporate 
documents with idealized versions of consent and contract. The 
existence of relationship contracts, contracts of adhesion, and other 
variants put pressure on the notion of an “ordinary contract.”37 For 
                                                      
33. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(“[T]he bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the 
directors, officers, and stockholders . . . .”); id. at 957 (calling the contract “inherently flexible”). 
34. Id.; Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (calling bylaws 
“contracts among a corporation’s shareholders” as a prelude to applying principles of contract 
interpretation). See generally Verity Winship, Litigation Rights and the Corporate Contract, in THE 
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES ch. 12 (William Savitt et al. eds., 2018); Ann M. 
Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and 
Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 587–88 (2016). 
35. Boilermakers Local, 73 A.3d at 938–39. Even the Delaware statute concerning forum 
selection terms is built on the presumption that charters and bylaws do not count as contracts for the 
Federal Arbitration Act, as its prohibition of arbitration clauses might otherwise impermissibly 
burden arbitration.  
36. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 161, 166 (2014). 
37. Although not at the center of their analysis, the authors mention some of these examples. See, 
e.g., Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 284 n.93. 
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example, it is not clear that shareholders give less consent than 
consumers when they click “I agree.”38 
At root, though, the authors argue that “blanket enforcement” of the 
forum selection terms in charters and bylaws cannot be justified by a 
reference to the talisman of shareholder consent.39 For now this 
discussion will borrow the authors’ working definition of corporate 
charters and bylaws as “hybrid legal structures that provide a mechanism 
for collective choice in the context of substantial state regulation and 
straddle the public-private divide,”40 even if one could fight about how 
dissimilar they are from contracts (and which contracts provide the 
source of comparison). 
Because corporate charters and bylaws are not contracts, the argument 
goes, courts are not bound by the rationales of the core U.S. Supreme 
Court cases that consider—and favor the enforcement of—contractual 
forum-selection clauses more generally. The courts are not bound by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s directive in The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.41 
that forum-selection clauses “should control absent a strong showing 
that they should be set aside.”42 Nor are they bound by the Court’s 
enforcement of a forum-selection clause in small print on the back of a 
cruise ticket (sent to passengers after the sale) in Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc. v. Shute.43 Courts are thus free to consider forum-selection terms in 
corporate charters and bylaws without a presumption that they are valid. 
So, what should courts consider? The Article proposes ways in which 
the lack of robust consent and the state’s special role should shape the 
court’s analysis. 
A. The Limits of Consent 
Although consent is key to the authors’ critique of treating charters 
and bylaws as contracts, the Article provides little guidance as to how 
the lack of robust consent affects what courts should consider. The 
authors argue that when no consent at all is given (e.g., creditor 
plaintiffs), these terms should not be enforced regardless of whether 
                                                      
38. Cf. Boilermakers Local, 73 A.3d at 957–58 (pointing out that shareholders have more 
recourse than consumers, who are unable to negotiate terms). 
39. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 270. 
40. Id. at 268. 
41. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
42. Id. at 15. 
43. 499 U.S. 585, 593–95 (1991); cf. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 62 
(2013) (directing courts to give forum selection clauses controlling weight in transfers among 
federal courts absent “extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties”). 
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claims fall within Delaware’s broad statutory language.44 They later 
suggest that the non-selected court (e.g., the Oregon court in TriQuint) 
should consider “the extent of the shareholders’ consent to the forum-
term,”45 but give little help in making that suggestion operational. 
Frankly, this gap is understandable, particularly given the varied 
relationships of shareholders to the corporate organizational documents. 
One could deem all unilaterally adopted bylaws invalid. But the authors 
do not do that; they “do not see the absence of full shareholder consent 
as sufficient for treating the forum term as unenforceable.”46 Indeed, to 
consider all unilateral bylaws suspect could nullify the state statutes that 
permit corporate management to take these unilateral actions.47 
Moreover, an underlying rationale exists for giving directors the 
ability to amend bylaws unilaterally. Picture a change to some innocuous 
housekeeping bylaw. And then picture one that is more problematic. 
Because they are both unilaterally adopted, a court needs something 
besides the concept of consent to distinguish between the two. Fiduciary 
duties and review for fundamental fairness may be more apt tools, as 
explored below. 
Consent may also fail to provide much of a limiting factor for a 
potentially large category of provisions. Midstream adoption 
characterized the early examples. However, some evidence suggests that 
Delaware companies are moving towards including forum selection in 
the boilerplate of IPO charters.48 More empirical work is needed, but if 
that is the case, consent will not provide a limit for this large category 
under the authors’ framework: charter provisions have the “strongest 
case for consent,” in part because shareholders are on notice.49 
B. Can Delaware Really Do That? 
What about the state’s special role in corporate organizational 
documents? How should that affect whether courts should enforce a 
forum-selection term? The authors raise an interesting question about 
                                                      
44. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 293–94. 
45. Id. at 299. 
46. Id. at 271. 
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2018); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2016). 
48. A study of adoption by Delaware companies through 2014 identified a movement towards 
including forum selection in the boilerplate of IPO charters in Delaware public companies. See 
Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder 
Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31 (2017). 
49. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 282.  
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Delaware’s (and several other states’) approach. By statute, since 2015, 
Delaware permits exclusive forum terms in charters and bylaws, but 
only if they do not exclude the incorporating state.50 Several states have 
enacted similar statutes since.51 
Based on these statutes, the authors ask whether “the intermediary of 
the ‘corporate contract’ permit[s] the state to achieve indirectly goals 
that it could not achieve directly because of constitutional limits on 
government power?”52 A statute that simply declared that Delaware 
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over Delaware corporate law claims 
would run into constitutional limits.53 Does the Delaware statute limiting 
private parties’ ability to select a forum have the same defects? 
Rather than provide a definitive answer, the authors build these 
concerns into their advice for the considering court as reasons to 
invalidate a clause.54 This intriguing question is not, however, entirely in 
harmony with the frame of advice-giving. Companies are not required to 
adopt an exclusive forum bylaw at all, so there seems to be an 
intervening actor and choice. It is also not clear why courts should 
punish litigants for the alleged overreaching of the incorporating state, 
particularly when they might have chosen the incorporating state even 
without the statutory restriction. 
It may also be quite uninviting for a sister court to pass judgment on 
the ability of the Delaware or other state legislature to pass such a 
statute. Particularly if the approach forces the court to distinguish 
between permissible motives (“self-promotion when the challenged law 
is aimed at favoring the state itself or its subdivisions”) and 
impermissible ones (“promot[ion of] the private interest of the local 
bar”).55 And it may be equally uninviting to consider the difficult 
questions (which the authors do not definitively answer either) about 
whether the constitutionality of the state legislation changes when 
couched as a limit on private ordering rather than a direct limit on where 
suits may be brought. In sum, whether Delaware can pass such a statute 
                                                      
50. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115. 
51. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-113(b)(2)(ii) (West 2018) (“The charter or 
bylaws of a corporation may not prohibit bringing an internal corporate claim in the courts of this 
State or a federal court sitting in this State.”). 
52. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 269. 
53. See Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 88 
(analyzing the constitutional limits on such a potential statute, prompted by early signs that 
corporate litigation was moving out of Delaware).  
54. See Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, section III.A. 
55. Id. at 291. 
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is unanswered, and non-Delaware courts seem unlikely to step in and fill 
the gap. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Being a critic is easy; it is much more difficult to identify alternatives. 
Outlined below is an alternative route to the authors’ desired result: that 
courts avoid simply deferring to forum-selection charter provisions and 
bylaws on the basis of consent. This Part develops the suggestion that 
existing doctrines may take care of many of the problems that the 
authors identify. 
Because dispute resolution terms vary widely and some have dramatic 
effect on shareholder litigation, it is also worth considering more broadly 
applicable ways to identify permissible terms. This Part concludes by 
considering how heightened consent requirements might accommodate 
some of the nuances in this area. 
A. Back to Basics 
The authors note that they are least worried about representative suits 
by shareholders, particularly in the context of ubiquitous deal litigation. 
This is the circumstance of the TriQuint litigation, and the framework 
the authors propose does little to change the outcome there (unless the 
Oregon court should punish litigants for Delaware’s legislation). 
Existing doctrines address other problematic examples that the 
authors give, such as non-shareholder plaintiffs or suits brought in out-
of-the-way courts. Courts can determine whether a term was adopted in 
violation of fiduciary duties; evaluate whether a forum-selection clause 
is fundamentally fair and consistent with public policy; or use both of 
these existing frameworks, as did the TriQuint court.56 
If the degree of consent provides limited guidance and the state role is 
difficult to implement, what remains are the classic concerns about 
forum-selection clauses and the classic solutions, with an overlay of 
corporate law. Three main worries seem to motivate the authors here: an 
unfair process of adoption, unfair content, and third-party effects. 
The Process of Adoption Was Unfair. Courts could say that these 
terms are always unfair if unilaterally adopted. But not every bylaw is 
suspect. As noted above, it is necessary to have some way of 
                                                      
56. In TriQuint, the Oregon court eventually enforced the forum-selection term, and the litigation 
was resolved in Delaware courts. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328, 338 (Or. 
2015); Granted Notice and [Proposed] Order of Voluntary Dismissal, In re TriQuint Semiconductor, 
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9415-VCN (Del. Ch. Jan. 20, 2015). 
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distinguishing among terms on the spectrum from innocuous 
housekeeping to insidious self-dealing. 
So, what can be done if the answer is that forum-selection terms are 
sometimes unfair? This is where existing fiduciary duty analyses can do 
some work. To determine whether directors adopted the clause in 
violation of their fiduciary duties, timing matters, as do conflicts of 
interest. The Delaware Supreme Court established such a fiduciary 
review in a case where it invalidated bylaws that advanced the 
shareholder meeting date and moved the meeting to a remote location.57 
Although the directors had the power to adopt such bylaws unilaterally 
under corporate law, the bylaws were invalid because directors adopted 
them to perpetuate themselves in office.58 Similarly, courts could 
invalidate forum-terms adopted for inequitable purposes. The fiduciary 
duty solution is imperfect, but may be able to address some of the 
excesses that the authors depict. 
The Content of the Clause Gives Its Adopter an Unfair Advantage. 
The authors also point to worries that the selected forum is far away, 
putting pressure on the prospective plaintiff, or that procedures in the 
selected forum disfavor the plaintiff. Forum-selection terms might also 
cause suits to be split between different courts or force them to take 
place without important players. 
Again, existing doctrines may be enough to address many of these 
concerns. The Carnival Cruise Lines Court called for “judicial scrutiny 
for fundamental fairness.”59 A non-chosen court could consider whether 
a forum-selection term was “reasonable” by treating the organizational 
documents as contractual for this purpose and applying the 
“reasonableness” requirement (arguably in a more robust form than 
some courts have engaged).60 Or courts could reason by analogy, 
without conceding the bigger point that charter and bylaws are “ordinary 
contracts.” As the authors point out, their argument allows for treating 
governance documents “as analogous to contracts in certain respects.”61 
This reasonableness analysis may be attractive to the non-chosen 
court because it does not require difficult questions about consent and 
                                                      
57. Schnell v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
58. Id. 
59. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). 
60. See id. 
61. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 281 n.79 (“Our argument that charters and bylaws lack 
the degree of consent found in ordinary contracts does not imply that these governance documents 
should not be treated as analogous to contracts in certain respects . . . . What is significant is 
determining when and why the contractual paradigm should dominate and when it should not.”). 
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other states’ motives. It may also be attractive for choice-of-law reasons. 
Courts often apply the incorporating state’s law to the question of 
whether these organizational documents are contracts, but may apply 
their own law to questions about reasonableness and public policy,62 
leaving more space for interpretation and legal development. 
The Term Affects Third Parties. The Article argues that the Delaware 
legislation defining permissible forum-selection terms could cover 
claims by creditors or others for whom no argument about consent, even 
the most attenuated, is plausible.63 The authors interpret the statutory 
language to permit terms to reach fiduciary duty, federal securities law, 
and even employment discrimination claims.64 They identify creditors as 
an example of non-consenting third parties who might have claims in 
these categories. 
But a discussion of which claims are covered cannot ignore whose 
claims are covered. It seems unlikely that the statute means that anyone 
with a fiduciary duty, securities law claim, or employment 
discrimination claim against the company and its directors is bound by 
the term. Cases considering forum-selection clauses in other contexts 
routinely consider who is bound by the agreement containing the 
clause.65 While the Delaware corporate legislation focuses on defining 
the types of claims, the underlying assumption is likely that the claims 
must be of the parties to the corporate charter and bylaws, which are 
variously listed as shareholders, the company, or the state—not, notably, 
creditors.66 
The comparable question becomes: When are non-signatories bound 
by a forum-selection clause? The general rule in Delaware, for example, 
is that “only the formal parties to a contract are bound by its terms,” 
including forum-selection terms.67 Exceptions exist, however. Non-
signatories may be bound if the forum-selection clause is valid, the 
defendants are “third-party beneficiaries, or closely related to, the 
                                                      
62. William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It 
Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 17 (2006); see Roberts v. 
TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328, 330 (Or. 2015). 
63. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 294; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2018). 
64. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 294. 
65. See, e.g., Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383–84 (2d Cir. 2007) (listing four 
factors for courts to consider when deciding whether to enforce a forum selection clause, including 
“whether the claims and parties involved in the suit are subject to the forum selection clause” 
(emphasis added)). 
66. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 281. 
67. Alliance Data Sys. Corp. v. Blackstone Capital Partners V L.P., 963 A.2d 746, 760 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
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contract,”68 and “the agreement containing the forum selection clause 
[is] the agreement that gives rise to the substantive claims brought by or 
against a non-signatory.”69 “Closely related” requires something more 
than the relationship between shareholders and creditors of the same 
company; the party must receive a direct benefit or foreseeably be bound 
by the agreement. These limits on applying forum-selection clauses to 
non-signatories developed outside the corporate context might very well 
be used to limit third-party effects here, contract or not. 
B. Heightened Consent 
Most of this essay has responded to the Article’s first goal: to develop 
an operational framework for judicial review of corporate forum terms. 
This last section addresses the Article’s second and broader goal: to use 
this analysis as “a window into larger issues of state power and private 
ordering.”70 
The authors suggest a suite of private and public concerns that are 
specific to one particular type of dispute resolution term. Guidance for 
the other categories, especially mandatory arbitration, is beyond the 
Article’s scope. Nonetheless, it is worth pausing to think about what a 
broader approach might look like, particularly because forum-selection 
terms may not cause the biggest fight. Mid-stream adoption may be a 
transitional problem; this is an empirical question. But more importantly, 
with the limits above—a reasonable forum, consistent with fiduciary 
duties, and fundamentally fair—these forum-selection clauses preserve 
shareholder litigation and access to court, while addressing some of 
shareholder litigation’s defects. 
What would a broader approach require? As in the specific example 
of forum-selection terms, it needs two things: a way to distinguish 
between permissible and impermissible terms, and a way to balance 
private ordering with the public aspects of corporations. 
One basis for identifying permissible terms is to consider dispute 
resolution terms in corporate charters and bylaws most acceptable where 
                                                      
68. Weygandt v. Weco, LLC, No. 4056-VCS, 2009 WL 1351808, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 14, 2009). 
69. Id. at *4 n.15; see also In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 813 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“In order to bind a non-party [to the contract] to a forum selection clause, the party must be closely 
related to the dispute such that it becomes foreseeable that it will be bound. A non-party is closely 
related to a dispute if its interests are completely derivative of and directly related to, if not 
predicated upon the signatory party’s interests or conduct.”); Pegasus Strategic Partners v. Stroden, 
No. 653523/2015, 2016 WL 3386980, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 20, 2016) (citing Freeford Ltd. v. 
Pendleton, 53 A.D.3d 32, 38–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)). 
70. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 267. 
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they alter default rules in corporate law, and least acceptable where they 
effectively waive substantive requirements.71 This approach roots the 
limits on procedural private ordering in the substantive law. It thus 
allows for variation in the treatment of different legal areas governing 
corporations, especially distinguishing between state corporate law and 
federal securities law. 
Regardless of the basis for distinguishing between permissible and 
impermissible terms, these limitations can interact with concerns about 
consent. Worries about a particular bylaw, charter provision, or category 
of provisions could trigger a requirement of heightened consent. No 
longer would it be sufficient to deem shareholders to consent to a 
governance structure that eventually gives rise to a particular term. 
Instead, a shareholder vote could be required. (Though this consent is 
still not equivalent to an “ordinary contract,” because shareholders 
would be bound by a majority vote.) Or, as the authors mention, the 
shareholder must have voted for a particular amendment. Or a court or 
legislature could require a signed agreement. 
Use of heightened consent has precedents, even in the area of 
intracorporate dispute resolution. For example, Delaware’s fee-shifting 
legislation is explicit about the role of heightened consent. Although it 
bars fee-shifting provisions in charters and bylaws, its legislative history 
affirmatively contemplates fee-shifting clauses in agreements signed by 
the shareholder against whom the terms are enforced.72 Another example 
comes from shareholder arbitration, where at least one court required 
explicit consent to an arbitration bylaw.73 
A heightened consent approach takes concerns about consent 
seriously, but also takes into account the need to balance respect for 
private ordering with the state’s special role in corporations. 
                                                      
71. The points in this section are elaborated in Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 
supra note 8, at 524–28. 
72. S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015) (enacted) (amending DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 109(b)) (West 2018); id. at Synopsis §§ 2–5 (noting that the amendment “is not 
intended . . . to prevent the application of such [fee-shifting] provisions pursuant to a stockholders 
agreement or other writing signed by the stockholder against whom the provision is to be 
enforced”). 
73. See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 158, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that a shareholder could not be “compelled to arbitrate her civil rights claims pursuant to 
corporate bylaws to which she has not explicitly assented”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The above is a friendly critique. Corporate organizational documents 
and the shareholder’s relationship to them differ in many ways from 
other settings that involve contract and consent. And the state clearly has 
a historical and current role in defining the rights and duties of corporate 
actors. Turning these general observations into operational directions is 
more challenging, and this essay introduces some alternative approaches. 
But Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate “Contracts” provides a 
nuanced account, intriguing observations, and welcome participation in 
the broader debate over the balance between private ordering and public 
restraint in corporate law. 
 
